Author Archives: caidid

Meditation on Memorial Day

I have been lucky. Many of my friends and family members - and I know many of those who are kind enough to read Gunpowder & Lead - have people close to them who have given their lives in service. I have never lost anyone like that. I know I don’t carry the kind of raw personal connection to Memorial Day that, to name one, Alex Horton writes about so achingly beautifully. I do try to honor it each year, though, because the sacrifice these people and their families have made - and the fact that it has ever been, and continues to be, necessary - matters to all of us.

For the last few years, I have spent a little time each Memorial Day at the flag garden planted on Boston Common by the Massachusetts Military Heroes Fund. There are 33,000 flags this year, one for each MA service member who has died in service from the Civil War to today.

There are a lot of stories that stick with me through the year, and the one I found myself thinking about most today as I looked at the field of flags fluttering across the hill was that of Sgt. Dennis Weichel. I didn’t know Sgt. Weichel, but I know what kind of man he was by how he died.

This past March, Sgt. Weichel’s unit was traveling in a convoy in Laghman Province, Afghanistan, when they came on a group of children in the road. Sgt. Weichel was one of the men who got out of their vehicles to clear the road. As the MRAP started to move again, he saw that one little girl had run back into its path.

That is a split-second kind of moment. There isn’t time to consider whether an attempt to save her might be fatal, to weigh the value of your own life against that of a small Afghan girl. What you do in that moment is not about being a man, or a soldier, or an American. It is not about training, or calculation, or decision-making. It is built into who you are.

Sgt. Weichel jumped into the street. He pushed the little girl to safety. She was unhurt. He died. That’s hero stuff. A huge vehicle was about to hit a little girl. He made sure it didn’t. I didn’t know Sgt. Weichel, but he’s who I’m remembering this Memorial Day.

The flag garden is a beautiful and somber reminder of the sacrifice made by these service men and women, and their loved ones. Even more than that, to me, it is a reminder of how much we should all passionately want peace, and work to nurture it, and build it, so that in the future we won’t have to lose so many of the best of us this way.

It is easy to get angry and look to attack, to get impatient with diplomacy, or even to get overwhelmed by heartbreak when something terrible happens in the world, but looking at those rows upon rows of flags, or the rows upon rows of white tombstones at Arlington, it seems to me that the best way to honor their sacrifice is to do all we can to try to make future such sacrifices unnecessary.

Forget anger and blame toward the many people, institutions, situations, cultural features, interests, and social mores that might lead us into war. Forget outrage and pique at those who question the circumstances that lead to these sacrifices. Forget semantic battles over what it means to be a hero. Blame doesn’t make it better. Outrage doesn’t satisfy anyone. Semantics are meaningless. Let’s take all that energy that is so often spent on blame and outrage and use it to connect and build, to take tiny steps to nurture peace in whatever ways we can.

No one wants the fields of little flags to grow.

Posted in Uncategorized, War | Tagged , | 1 Comment

The Sistani succession question

Up on Foreign Affairs right now is a piece by Paul McGeough, the latest in a series of stories to appear in the media over the last couple of months about the succession of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the pre-eminent Shiite religious leader in the world. Like previous stories on this subject, it primarily focuses on Iran’s efforts to influence - or co-opt - the succession through its candidate Ayatollah Shahroudi, who has set up offices in Najaf and has been busy buying influence among junior clerics with Iranian money and meeting with the likes of Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki, who would love to have more influence with Sistani’s successor than he does with the independent-minded Sistani.

I’ve written about this before, but there are some things worth addressing in this piece. I didn’t have a lot of quibbles with it overall, but there are a few places where it misses or comes up short.

First, the article gives the impression that Sistani’s succession is an all-or-nothing proposition, that whoever succeeds him will be the spiritual leader for all Shia everywhere.

As many as 100 junior ayatollahs will have a role in selecting the next spiritual leader. Loosely the equivalent of the Christian rank of bishops, they command a following among the faithful that translates into lobbying power.

However, the way it’s described is misleading. A Shiite marja is not like the Catholic Pope. Many people will of course follow the guidance of clerics, but each individual may choose his or her own marja from among all qualified and willing individuals. Sistani is certainly the most widely influential marja, but he is not the only one and it is not a given that in the event of his death, all of his followers would go to one successor. In fact, with the lack of a clear successor in Najaf, and the controversial nature of Shahroudi’s position on velayat-e faqih (the Iranian system of governance by jurisprudent), it is a distinct possibility that there would be a split, with a portion of Sistani’s followers going to Shahroudi and a portion going to someone else, such as al-Hakim.

McGeough also stops short while delving into the question of financial influence in the succession. He discusses the Iranian money Shahroudi has been throwing around - and that can certainly provide the chosen candidate with a significant boost - but there are other wealthy and influential organizations that can have a say in the succession.

Part of the job of a marja is to collect funds from his followers (sometimes both the khums and zakat, which amount roughly to a tithe and alms respectively and can add up to quite a significant amount of money) and distribute them to the needy. An influential marja generally has a large foundation that oversees clinics, schools, orphanages, community centers, hospitals - a range of charitable institutions. He will also have a network of junior clerics who are empowered to collect on his behalf and who serve as his agents (wakils) in different areas where he holds or seeks to hold influence. I know this is getting a little into the nerdy details, but here’s the point. When a marja dies, his network and foundation don’t just go away; and when a major internationally influential marja dies, he can leave behind a pretty large and wealthy network; and when that marja is greatly respected, even revered, people will pay attention to what his foundation does.

Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, Sistani’s teacher and predecessor, left behind a very large and influential foundation, which supported Sistani according to al-Khoei’s explicitly stated wishes. This foundation, still large, wealthy, and respected, will be in a position to give a boost to its chosen candidate, as will Sistani’s own foundation, just to name a few other possible players.

Historically the Najaf hawza has preferred to stay out of politics and has preferred that politics stay out of it. Even if Iran and Maliki’s government in Iraq throw their weight behind Shahroudi, it doesn’t mean he will come out on top in the succession contest. It might just be that no one does.

h/t to Sina Kashefipour, also known as @rejectionking, for linking me to this piece, and for many interesting conversations on this subject.

Posted in Middle East, Shiism, Uncategorized | Tagged , , , , , | Leave a comment

We’ve got drones and SOF teams. Who should we go after?

‘We’ve got drones and SOF teams. Who should we go after?’

This is how the target selection process sounds to me when I read about it. My semi-secret fear is that this might be quite close to how this process actually works. The Global War on Terror, the shadow war, the overseas contingency operation - whatever you want to call it, I’ve long worried that its reach and the place of importance it is given are out of proportion to any threat posed by Al Qaeda or any similar group, and I’ve long feared that the way we go about ‘countering’ terrorism may in fact cause more problems than it solves, possibly by orders of magnitude. I am no insider. I don’t see the process. I would like to think that more care is put into these decisions than it seems from the outside. But from here, from the outside, it seems like no matter how many times - through decades of experience - we see the second and third order effects, the collateral damage, the side effects of our actions, the people making the decisions are not really concerning themselves with taking time to consider how the benefits balance out against the potential unintended consequences and long-term effects. And it’s not just about doing things we maybe shouldn’t be doing; it’s also about failing to do things we maybe should be doing.

Then when I read an article like this one by Kimberly Dozier (and I strongly recommend reading that), it reads very cart-before-horse to me, like ‘Who are we going after with these drones and SOF guys?’ and not ‘This AQ leader is a terrible threat. What are we going to do about that?’ I’m not saying that we shouldn’t have contingency plans in place for how to deal with potential real threats to U.S. security, but it seems like more than that. I fear that maybe we use these tactics just because we can, that because we have drones and incredibly skilled and versatile SOF teams and such, we just look for people to use them on. That scares me because it implies a casual attitude toward the many forms of potential collateral damage, scant consideration of long term effects (and therefore the absence of a robust long term guiding strategy), meaning finally, an approach to national security that is not actually optimized to keep our nation secure.

The drones aren’t the issue any more than any other tool or tactic is - they are a tool, and can be a very valuable one - but if we’re looking around for people to kill with them rather than using them only in service of a true strategy or to counter a clear threat that has arisen, then we’re doing it wrong, and if we’re doing it wrong - and this is true even if you are concerned only with American interests and are fully indifferent to the collateral damage done to and within local populations in the areas of operation - we risk having to pay a harsh price in five years, or ten, or twenty, when the right things we didn’t do and the collateral effects of the things we did do comes back to haunt us.

But please tell me I’m wrong. I’ll feel a lot better if I am.

Bonus reading: h/t to Rob Caruso for linking up three great recommendations for current reading on operations (which yes, very much do consist of more than just drones): “Offshoring CT: Towards a Dissection” - Dan Trombly for Abu Muqawama; “The Vickers Doctrine” - Robert Caruso at Rocky Shoals; and “U.S. Foreign Policy and Contested Sovereignty” - Micah Zenko for CFR. All good reads that bear on various aspects of this subject, none quite addresses the question of what kind of big-picture, long-term strategy guides these operations, although Caruso comes closest to getting into this in that his (very interesting) post offers guidance on structure and prioritization in operations going forward.

Posted in Military, Strategery, Terrorism, Uncategorized, War | 9 Comments

What’s good for King Abdullah is not necessarily good for everyone

Yesterday, on Foreign Policy, Robert Haddick argued that the Persian Gulf - sorry, the Gulf That Must Not Be Named - needs its own NATO, and that the U.S. needs to be a part of it. Essentially, he argues that the current situation in the Gulf, as Saudi Arabia tries to coax the GCC into a closer union, is similar to that in western Europe at the time NATO was founded:

In 1949, Western European and U.S. leaders saw an expansionist Soviet Union that maintained a menacing army and was simultaneously instigating internal subversion in Greece, central Europe, Italy, and elsewhere. Abdullah and his fellow Sunni royals worry about Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs and its support for proxy forces in Lebanon and Syria and provocateurs in Bahrain, eastern Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. The solution for Western leaders in 1949 was a military alliance based on the principle of collective security. Abdullah apparently wants something similar.

As he sees it, the U.S. could play a similar role in a Gulf NATO:

As an outsider that had no claims in Europe and was largely neutral regarding the internal squabbles among the other members, the United States was seen as a partner all the European leaders could trust and the sole force that could hold the alliance together against its self-defeating instincts. The U.S. claim to leadership was certainly aided by its overwhelming economic and military strength after the war. But Europeans also trusted the United States to lead the alliance because an ocean separated it from Europe.

Without even getting into the logistical feasibility of such an alliance - read Stephen Saideman for what it really means to be like NATO - this argument is problematic at best. In making his case for this treaty, Mr. Haddick declines to address some very major assumptions underlying the whole issue.

For starters, the primary driver of Saudi Arabia’s current bid for closer union - particularly with Bahrain - is internal, not external. It is about quashing internal dissent from the Shia populace in Bahrain, and in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. However much the Kings of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain may try to frame these internal problems as the work of Iranian agitators, they have much more to do with domestic inequalities and repression than with any ties to Iran. And in fact, the security concerns of gulf states generally tend to be internal more than external. Many people already see a U.S. hand in the crackdowns in Bahrain. A formal alliance on the order of NATO would not help this perception in the slightest.

Mr. Haddick mentions the other Gulf states’ concerns about Saudi - “Although the leaders undoubtedly fear revolution and Iran, for the moment they fear the House of Saud even more” - but he doesn’t take the extra step to consider whether or not those fears might be well founded. The other Gulf rulers certainly want to ensure their own sovereignty, and it’s perfectly understandable that when entering into a union with other nations, led by a dominant regional power, they would want “details, and the details of the details” as the Saudi Foreign Minister put it.

Related to that and also not addressed is the possibility that what’s good for Saudi Arabia is not necessarily good for everyone, and this goes for both the other Gulf states and the U.S. Just because King Abdullah wants closer security cooperation doesn’t mean that is in everyone’s best interests. All that tells you is that it is in King Abdullah’s best interests.

Consideration should also be given to the people of the states in question. Do we want to be part of a formal security alliance that, for example, is supported by the Bahraini regime but opposed by the majority of its people? The U.S. has quite clearly been willing to put certain national interests above human rights to a degree in Bahrain and elsewhere, but where should the line be drawn?

I’ve argued before that U.S. support for repressive regimes is not only awkward in terms of our attempts to promote democracy and human rights, but also a potential longterm strategic disaster. Binding ourselves more tightly to these regimes in a security agreement similar to NATO would make later negative repercussions more assured and potentially much worse. And then there’s this:

 

Scary thought.

Posted in Middle East, NATO, Saudi Arabia, Uncategorized | Tagged , , , | 1 Comment

Well played, Marine Corps

Last week it was announced that the USMC will be allowing women to attend its infantry training programs, beginning with the Infantry Officers’ Course and later expanding to training opportunities for enlisted women. While this doesn’t mean that female Marines who complete the training would now be allowed into combat roles, it is still a big step, and a smart move by the Marine Corps.

Many people feel at this point that it is inevitable that our military will have full equality of opportunity. This step seems to be an indication that the Marine Corps certainly thinks so. By starting to filter women into infantry training now, the Corps is putting itself in position to be able to implement immediately when that time comes.

More importantly in the short term, it allows the Marines to take the next step in the exploration of lifting the ban on women in combat that has been going on for more than a year. A close look at standards, an assessment of what is truly required in order for combat units to be effective, will be an important step. The Marine Corps Times reports that “new functional fitness tests are being developed to help Marine Corps leaders determine how women and men perform in, and cope with, various combat tasks. The goal is to establish “gender-neutral” physical fitness standards.” Incorporating women into infantry training programs allows the Corps to test and refine these standards in a hands on manner with real men and women, and doing so now, before there is any directive requiring women to be allowed in combat units, gives them time to do this the right way.

I have stated before that I think women should have the same opportunities as men to serve in our military, provided they can meet the necessary standards to ensure the maximum possible safety and effectiveness of our combat forces. It’s great to see the USMC taking serious and responsible steps toward this.

Posted in Uncategorized | 6 Comments

Review: Will McCants’ Founding Gods, Inventing Nations

Will McCants’ Founding Gods, Inventing Nations is not a simple history of rulers and conquests but something subtler, a history of the perceptions and cultural contests inside ancient conquests. Concentrating on the Greek, Roman, and Arab empires, McCants looks at the many interpretations and re-interpretations of the roots of culture - cities and medicine and tool use and philosophy and ironwork and geometry and agriculture and astronomy - touching on myths and origin stories in those cultures after outlining some of the culture myths as they existed in more ancient empires such as the Sumerian, Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian.

McCants uses the lens of these culture myths to try to understand the interactions between conquerors and conquered, how peoples assimilate or assert themselves. He makes the point that times of conquest and the aftermath thereof are periods of flux for all parties involved. Conquerors do not universally impose their will or their way on the conquered. Cultural influence is a negotiation: it goes both ways, and the way culture myths are told, especially at these times of flux, is instructive of the social and political needs of the day. He compares the approaches to culture myths of individuals at the times of the Greek, Roman, and Arab conquests in four categories - divine providence, “firsts,” founders of native civilizations, and the origins of the sciences – and discusses the contexts and motivations in each era for each category.

We can see some parallels in all the periods discussed. All three conquering empires – Greek, Roman, and Arab – soon saw native elites writing histories of their (the natives’) forefathers’ contributions to civilization in their own languages, and for a similar range of reasons: to instill or boost local pride, to show the conquerors what they owed the conquered, to persuade the conquerors to behave like native rulers, to discredit local rivals, or to elevate themselves above other conquered peoples.

However, similar paths could lead to different places in each period. For example, there are lists of ‘firsts’ surviving from all three periods, but the type of activities and inventions on the lists, and the attributions for them, differed greatly. Writers in all three periods dealt with some of the same questions, including whether the Greeks had originated anything or borrowed from other cultures, and whether humans could develop complex sciences on their own or if divine inspiration of some kind was required, but the conclusions they reached depended on the cultural context and requirements of the time.

Perhaps the area of most divergence was on the origin of the sciences, as even within each culture there existed debate on whether the sciences were given to man by divine intercession or earned through his own ingenuity, as well as contention over which civilizations were the first to use certain sciences, regardless of whether the initial providence was human or divine.

I won’t get into his specific conclusions about each conquest, because you should read it yourself, but McCants tells us in his introduction:

In recounting these culture myths, authors worked out their place in post-conquest society. By describing the origin and transmission of science, they tell us where they stand in relation to that tradition, to their contemporaries who practice it, and to those who detract from it. By writing histories of the cultural exploits of ancient heroes, they tell us how they think of their ethnic origins and how others can join or be excluded from their group. By making lists of beneficial arts and sciences, they encode the ideal cultural genealogy of their societies and provide the knowledge needed to navigate it. By demonstrating how God works in the world, they explain how society should be ordered and who should maintain it. These scholarly activities were at no time more important than after conquest, when the place of the conqueror and the conquered were both unstable and in need of mooring to the ancient past.

Though the book’s focus is on ancient times, its insights into power, perception, and persuasion are relevant down to the present day. The early Islamic empires saw both conquerors and conquered grappling with the establishment of an Islamic culture in negotiation with the Qur’anic values of the conquerors, and the established high cultures of the Greeks, Iranians, and others whom they conquered. In the modern post-colonial period, populations are still defining and re-defining Islamic culture, no longer in relation to conquered elites, but to liberalism, democracy, and the legacy of colonial powers. The solutions thus far have included forms of government from Iranian velayat-e faqih to the Turkish secular parliamentary system to the religiously-backed monarchy of Saudi Arabia, with many nations currently in flux; and intellectual approaches that run the whole gamut from salafi movements such as that of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab which seek to return Islam to a perceived pure original state, to the work of intellectuals such as Khaled Abou El Fadl who seek to derive an Islamic context for democracy. Living within borders drawn and re-drawn by the Ottomans, then the French and British, and living with the legacy of colonial occupiers, as well as contemporary resource issues and the long shadow of American interests, it is again a time of renewal and redefinition.

And it is not just relevant to Islamic culture. This book is not about one single culture, nor does it speak only to the concerns of empires; it is about negotiations between cultures, the projection of power, and the exercise of influence. As an American, I can’t help but consider things in terms of American power. There is food for thought here in how our sway shows in the world at large, and how we in turn can be impacted by the cultures with which we interact, and the culture of those we occupy or influence.

The author has stated that if you (the reasonably educated reader) can’t understand this book, then he has failed. The book is clearly written, structured in a way that makes sense, and quite digestible in terms of both format and length. McCants does a creditable job of providing enough context that a reader who is not familiar with all of his sources can understand it but not so much that it bogs the book down. You don’t have to be a scholar of antiquity, or religion, or any other particular field in order to benefit from this book.

That being said, my own familiarity with the at least the rudiments of a lot of the material provided me with a good measure of my personal enjoyment of it. For me, the fun of reading diversely is in the connections your mind makes between things, especially things that seem disparate at first glance. It was a pleasure seeing the connections made by McCants - known to many for his expertise in counterterrorism and modern jihadi movements - among many disciplines including ancient history, religion, anthropology, poetry, modern religious scholarship, and mythology. I have a lifelong love of mythology of all kinds, and I have studied ancient history, Middle Eastern history, the Bible, and Islam, so McCants’ wide variety of sources were also a delight. The book is peppered with excerpts from Babylonian tablets, Sumerian poetry, Egyptian scrolls, the works of Homer and Aeschylus and Hesiod and Herodotus, Jewish/Christian apocrypha in which wayward angels sleep with humans and spread corruption, the Iranian epic Shahnamih, the Bible, and the Qur’an, just to name a few.

I would strongly recommend this book to anyone with an interest in history or mythology, or a penchant for thinking about complex ideas like the blurred lines of influence between conquerors and conquered. It is well-written, rich with wonderful source materials, educational on the cultural milieux of these ancient conquests, and thought-provoking in terms of how we perceive culture, power, and influence.

———

My one tiny quibble with the book is purely geekery-based and has nothing to do with writing or scholarship, but I just can’t help myself from mentioning it: McCants devastatingly missed an opportunity to reference the greatest science fiction film ever made (and my favorite movie) Ridley Scott’s 1982 masterpiece Blade Runner, in his conclusion. He uses the phrase “more Arab than Arab” and references a 2002 book’s use of the term “more English than the English” rather than Blade Runner‘s Tyrell Corporation’s motto “More Human Than Human,” an oversight that I’m sure will haunt him until the end of his days.

Posted in Reviews, Uncategorized | Tagged | 1 Comment

Syria, bearing witness, and doing something

Just before bed last night, I read Marie Colvin’s report from Baba Amr for the Sunday Times from last weekend. It was a grim read. She painted a vivid picture of the fear and want and constant danger of the place. The first thing I saw on Twitter when I got up this morning was the news that she had been killed, as had French photojournalist Remi Ochlik and Syrian journalist Rami al-Sayed. These three are just the most recent on a list of witnesses killed by Asad. He has slaughtered thousands, and among them have been a number who were working and risking their lives to bear witness and to bring stories and images and simple awareness of his atrocities to the world’s attention day after day. Reports that the target hit in this particular attack was no coincidence serves as a reminder of the importance of this witness. If videos, photos, stories were not making their way out of Syria each day - as hard as this might be to imagine - Asad’s attacks might very well be much worse.

I haven’t commented on this all day. I was shaken - by these deaths, by Anthony Shadid’s last week, by Colvin’s last few reports and so many more we have seen from Syria. I know the desperate, helpless feeling of ‘We have to DO SOMETHING.’ I’ve been thinking about it all day. Nearly all discussion on what that something might be comes down to military intervention, or arming the rebels. I don’t think military intervention is in our best interests, and quite honestly, I don’t think it’s in the interests of most Syrians either (ask the people of Iraq or Afghanistan about their hundreds of thousands of dead).

The horror engendered by the images that come out of places like Homs and the terrible impatience that tells us something must be done now can make for a deadly combination, enticing people with the idea of just sending in troops or bombing Asad back to the Stone Age, but we have to remember that this is not a video game. I know that sounds flip, but I have to think some people must genuinely forget that, the glibness with which military intervention is so frequently suggested, lest I come to believe that they are ghouls or at least truly indifferent to death and suffering. War is never cut-and-dry. There are complications, unintended consequences, unanticipated casualties, enemy responses. Military strikes - even those undertaken with the best of intentions - kill people, and not always the ‘right’ people. Add to that the risk to American troops and stakes that could include the future stability of the entire region, and there is a high probability of any military intervention doing significantly more harm than good for all involved.

All that being said, I have been unable to escape the feeling that while I would take military action off the table, doing nothing is not an option either. It can seem painfully slow, to follow a diplomatic path toward helping Syria, and it is downright agonizing to watch the suffering of its people, but in the long run, a non-military approach has a better chance to benefit both U.S. interests and the future of Syria. One of the strongest proponents of the diplomatic route in the public discussion of options for Syria has been Marc Lynch. I have always found Mr. Lynch to be intelligent, principled, and possessed of deep knowledge of the region, so I have been eagerly anticipating his report for CNAS on Syria.

The report was released today, and while I have my doubts about our ability to execute some of his recommendations - How will we “reassure the Syrian public that abandoning its support for the Asad regime will not unleash the sort of sectarian war that killed hundreds of thousands of people in neighbouring Lebanon and Iraq”? How are we to guarantee reconciliation and not retaliation for political defectors? - I do think that Mr. Lynch’s plan represents the best option I have seen so far. He succinctly outlines all of the proposals along the military intervention/arm the rebels spectrum, and effectively dismisses each one, before outlining his own plan of “forceful diplomacy.” As is so often the case with good diplomacy, what he is proposing is complex and would require patience. It lacks the flash and immediacy of the military options, but this plan - or something like it - holds out the best hope for a solution that will not just oust Asad, but ensure a smoother, more inclusive, and more effective transition once he’s gone.

I encourage everyone to read it, and I’d love to hear other ideas, particularly from those who have a stronger background in diplomacy than I do. In the meantime, as one last note, I want to say: rest in peace, Ferzat Jarban, Basil al-Sayed, Shukri Abu al-Burghul, Gilles Jacquier, Mazhar Tayyara, Anthony Shadid, Rami al-Sayed, Marie Colvin, Remi Ochlik. I hope that the rest of us can find a way to make sure that your acts of witness inspire change, and that the sacrifice you made for them is honored.

Posted in Middle East, Uncategorized | Tagged , , , | 5 Comments

Women in combat: efficiencies, standards, expectations, perceptions, discourse

I posted a piece on Saturday about some of the issues around women in combat. It has drawn quite a lively response, both in support of and opposition to my arguments. I know that post barely touched on the myriad real-world logistics and complications, foreseen and unforeseen, that would come with implementation of a full integration of women into all military MOS’s. One of these issues was brought up by commenter BK:

But let’s talk about efficiencies… Is it efficient to have to to secure separate facilities for a handful of women in an environment that is completely dominated by males? This is the reverse of racially integrating the services. At that time, we had twice as many barracks and latrines as we needed because they had to be divided by race. By integrating the services we reduced the physical footprint of the military. It made sense. Effectiveness was difficult at first (there were race riots and lynching) but eventually the culture adapted and from a physical/mental stand point there was no discernible difference. Efficiency was IMPROVED by integrating the services and therefore, it was a win-win situation for the military.

Such is not the case for introducing women into combat units. Again, I think the culture will likely adapt, as it did after integration, but it will be painful in the short term and in today’s media environment considerably more well known than the problems of racial integration. (Consider the gender equivalent of racially motivated lynching…and no, I don’t have enough faith in the young Soldier fresh off the street and fueled by alcohol to expect that he will behave appropriately.) But eventually, this will all die down. (Just as racism and racially based attacks still occur in the US military, such things would still occur to women in the future, just not at the scale of the initial levels.) But…and here’s the kicker, I now need to expand my infantry basing requirements to include separate facilities for women, and that makes the force less efficient.

Aha! You say. Well, let’s just go the way of “Starship Troopers” and make everything unisex! Women and men can shower together. They can bunk together (in the same open bay, not in the same bed…at least, not officially). Problem solved. But, you gotta convince the wives and girlfiends this is a good idea (we eventually got their consent for missile silos and subs) and you have accept the abuses that are going to occur.

The facilities issue is just the sort of sticky thing we will have to contend with if and when women are allowed into all MOS’s. And my reference would have been Battlestar Galactica because I never miss an opportunity to reference Starbuck or Helo, but ideally we would have a gender-neutral system with shared facilities all around; however, I’m under no illusions about what a challenge this idea would present right now. It would be a hard thing to ask of any woman, considering the military’s serious sexual assault problem. I don’t doubt that making this kind of arrangement work requires a sea change in thinking.

Related to the issues BK broached, I had a conversation with a friend last night who asked me to square for him what seemed like disparate viewpoints: the desire for equality of opportunity for women on the one hand, and the special measures being undertaken by the military currently in an attempt to curb sexual assaults on women. I told him I did not see these as conflicting, not considering sexual assault prevention as special treatment but rather as an attempt to provide a reasonable baseline for a safe workplace. Both men and women deserve to be able to go to work without fear of being raped or otherwise attacked, and while even more underreported among men, this is a problem for both genders.

In the course of our conversation, he rightly stated that the way the sexual assault issue is framed is wrong - as being about men attacking women rather than simply about perpetrators and victims - and contributes to stereotypes about women being soft and weak, and men being tough and brutal.

I’ve been thinking about this and the issues brought up in the comments, and the conclusion I’ve reached is that the issue of sexual assault and the inequality issues I touched on in my Saturday post and its comment thread can be seen as symptoms of the same larger issue, a very basic mode of thinking that needs to change, specifically that woman are ‘other.’ Women are being viewed as an alien presence being forced upon military units. I don’t believe that everyone sees things this way, but I do believe that a good many people do. I suspect that we would find significantly fewer sexual assaults in units that foster a sense of camaraderie that includes everyone, regardless of gender. If the women in a unit are truly embraced as part of the unit, then it is not such a stretch to consider gender-neutral facilities and combat MOS’s.

The framing that my friend was referring to keeps women separate, and that is where it goes wrong. Sexual assault prevention is not about protecting women from men, it’s about protecting people from criminals. Sexual assault is not OK no matter who is committing it and no matter whom it is being committed against. I further reject BK’s argument - an argument that is quite common, I would add - that says essentially that men can’t be expected to not rape women in certain circumstances. This attitude not only takes agency and personal responsibility away from men, but represents a dangerous complacency with criminal behavior. [Update: please read the comments below. BK has responded to indicate that I misunderstood the original argument, and to clarify what was actually meant].

A more useful approach would be to work to change the culture that frames women and men as separate creatures in need of separate rules; and to straight-up expect more from people. If we treat rape as an inevitability and an expectation, we foster a culture where it’s seen as something verging on acceptable. Until we make these changes in our individual and institutional attitudes, inequality and sexual assault will both continue to be problems.

I’ll be the first to admit that this requires an enormous culture change, an alteration of deeply ingrained beliefs, cherished ideas, chronic complacency, and low expectations. It might seem idealistic, and I’ll cop to it: in some ways, I’m an idealist. I’m not blind to the enormous practical challenges and personal and logistical trials of such an undertaking. But I do believe in asking more of people, in holding people to a higher standard; and I believe that while we may never reach any ideal, if we don’t even bother to conceive of one, then what’s the point? I won’t accept inequality - or a rape epidemic - because the problem is too large or institutionalized or intractable, or because fixing it is too hard or painful or uncomfortable. We need ideals to weigh the right and wrong of our choices against. We have to want something better.

I’m not all starry eyes and pies in the sky though. It is a fact that the slow but steady arc of change has been toward allowing women into more and more roles in our military, so that it seems to be only a matter of time before all paths are open to women. I know that we need more than just high expectations and speeches about equality; we need consistent and serious consequences for sexual assault, and a sober assessment of standards and leadership. (See Jason Fritz over at Ink Spots, whose last couple of posts on this have been really giving me food for thought, on this subject. And I think a reassessment of leadership priorities is a good idea in general, not just because of gender issues). I think we are doing ourselves a disservice if we aren’t considering the future, and thinking about the best way of getting there and what changes we can make now that might ease later transitions.

One final confession: I’m still thinking all of this through. I considered not posting this, but I don’t learn nearly as much if I’m not participating in the conversation. I think public discourse is important in a general sense, and on a personal level, I appreciate all the comments, from those who agree with me and those who don’t. I’m happy to have people point out the angles I’m missing, or help me to flesh out ideas through debate or dialogue. So let’s keep talking.

Posted in Gender, Military | 12 Comments

Women in combat: just because we don’t like the issues people have with it doesn’t mean they’re not real

I grew up: fully convinced that I was inferior to no one; assuming that anything I wanted to achieve was possible; and blissfully unaware that the world outside did not always reflect these beliefs, that inequality lingered everywhere, and that many people had ideas about superiority and inferiority, and what other people could and couldn’t do. Before Operation Desert Storm, it never crossed my mind that women were not allowed to serve in combat, and when I found out, I thought it was incredibly stupid. If women wanted to serve their country, to risk their lives in tribute to that service, why on earth would they not be allowed to? Why should men have to bear that alone? It was hard for me to wrap my mind around it.

More than two decades after I first considered it, the issue of ‘women in combat’ still stirs up a lot of emotions in people, specifically the emotions that make people defensive. I could say this about many, many issues, but getting defensive is not productive here. Nor is name-calling or jumping to extreme conclusions. I think that those who oppose allowing women the same opportunities as men are wrong, but we need to be able to realistically face and discuss the legitimate questions and concerns around it. I think it is possible to acknowledge that these issues are real without allowing them to dictate our decisions.

The latest round of discussion was kicked off this week when the Pentagon, having wrapped up a nearly yearlong review of the issue ordered by Congress, announced the easing of some of the restrictions on women serving in combat roles. To a large degree, this change simply formalizes what has been a reality for some time. Women can now be formally assigned to battalions in certain roles where previously they would have been in those same roles but ‘attached’ temporarily. Women are still not permitted to hold certain MOS’s, including infantry (or: what most people think of when they think of troops in combat). Many see this as one small step toward the inevitable result of women being permitted to serve in any role in the military.

Here’s the part where I defend Andrew Exum (probably not surprising since I like and respect Ex) and…(probably not someone I’m likely to find myself defending very often) Rick Santorum? Yes, Rick Santorum, too.*

Santorum was asked for his thoughts on the loosened restrictions. Here’s what he said:

In the immediate aftermath of these comments, there was a general uproar as people understood Santorum to be arguing that women are too emotional to handle combat. There were some good reasons for thinking this: 1) We have all heard that tired old sexist excuse before, on this very issue, among others; and 2) Santorum did not do a very good job of saying what he was trying to say. See, that’s not actually what he meant. [I'm making no judgment here on whether or not Santorum is generally sexist, just addressing this particular statement].

Santorum made two points and, like it or not, they are both legitimate concerns. First, what he meant when he spoke of the emotional challenges of having women in combat was something like men’s protectiveness toward women. Second, in the follow-up interview, he also mentioned the average difference in physical abilities that exists between men and women. I’m stating this up front: I don’t think either of those is actually a reason to deny women the opportunity to pursue, e.g., a career in the infantry, or in a tank crew. I do think both points are worth unpacking a little.

Some men would have a harder time seeing women hurt or threatened in combat than other men. This is hard to refute. It’s ‘women and children first,’ or chivalry, or manners; or on the flip side, it’s condescension, or infantilization, or minimization. Whether it comes from a place of honor or a place of diminution, and whatever you want to call it, there’s no denying this could be an issue for some men. That being said, so what? It is incumbent on those men to be grown-ups, to be professionals, and to get over it and do their jobs. People adapt. Men will see women in different roles more often, they will become accustomed to it, the culture will change. The more common it is, the more normal it will become and the less of a potential issue it will be. In the meantime, we can rely on training and professionalism to carry people through.

As to the second point, the plain truth is that on average, men are bigger, faster, and stronger than women. It’s biology. This is not to say that all men are bigger and stronger and faster than all women - that is clearly not the case - but the average woman when compared to the average man will have more limited physical abilities. Plenty of people have expressed concern about women’s ability to meet the physical standards required to serve in a MOS like infantry. This issue, too, is quite simple to address: if they don’t meet the standards, they don’t get in. This shouldn’t be about getting a 50/50 breakdown of men and women in your infantry platoon; it should just be about women having the same opportunity to be a part of that platoon as a man. This might well mean that only a minuscule number of women will make it to the front lines in these roles. So be it. The standards should be maintained at a level that prioritizes the maximum safety and effectiveness of the unit. Maybe there aren’t many women who would have both the desire and the ability to serve in this capacity, but those who have the desire should certainly have the opportunity to demonstrate whether or not they have the ability.

There are any number of other details and questions around this issue that are worth discussing (the career advancement issue that partly informs this debate, for one), and perhaps I will come back to some of them in a later post, but in the interest of keeping to the discussion of the day, I will leave off here. Granting women the opportunity to take on any and all ‘combat roles’ will require something of a culture shift, but it is really just part of a larger cultural shift that has been ongoing in society for decades. I think it likely that it will happen, and I don’t doubt that it will continue to be contentious until it does, but in the meantime, it doesn’t make for useful discourse when supporters of equality pretend that all of the questions, customs, and attitudes of opponents don’t exist, or dismiss them outright, any more than it helps when opponents resort to rank sexism or condescension to try and make their case. Here’s hoping that public debate of this issue will continue, and that it will be more civil than not.

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*It should be noted that Santorum made these points as part of an argument against women in combat, while Ex has repeatedly stated that he favors equal opportunity.

Posted in Gender, Military | Tagged | 62 Comments

On Taking Nonviolence Seriously

Daniel Serwer has a post at the Atlantic arguing for the use of nonviolent means in the Syrian conflict:

The point is to demonstrate wide participation, mock the authorities, and deprive them of their capacity to generate fear. When I studied Arabic in Damascus a few years ago, I asked an experienced agitator friend about the efficacy of the security forces. She said they were lousy. “What keeps everyone in line?” I asked. “Fear,” she replied. If the oppositions resorts to violence, it helps the authorities: by responding with sometimes random violence, they hope to re-instill fear.

It has stirred up mentions of unicorns and rainbows and that sort of thing from the many who discount this as a pipe dream. I understand the urge to dismiss nonviolence in the face of the brutality of the Syrian regime. I certainly don’t know what is best for the people of Syria in this conflict, and I’m not sure I would have the courage to urge non-violence to people who are being attacked by their own government daily, but I would urge anyone dismissing nonviolent means as completely absurd to read a little Gene Sharp (whose work Mr. Serwer references in his piece) first.

Early in his seminal work From Dictatorship to Democracy (pdf), Sharp makes a key point about the why for nonviolent means, that ”By placing confidence in violent means, one has chosen the very type of struggle with which the oppressors nearly always have superiority.”

It is not a casual use of nonviolence that Sharp encourages; he urges very calculated use of nonviolent tactics as part of a thorough plan. He puts great emphasis on the importance of strategic planning in revolution. He is quite clear that it is not enough to simply to use nonviolent means randomly. Carefully planned use of non-violence has much more potential for effectiveness than any willy-nilly application of various means.

Very careful thought based on a realistic assessment of the situation and the capabilities of the populace is required in order to select effective ways to achieve freedom under such circumstances.

If one wishes to accomplish something, it is wise to plan how to do it. The more important the goal, or the graver the consequences of failure, the more important planning becomes. Strategic planning increases the likelihood that all available resources will be mobilized and employed most effectively. This is especially true for a democratic movement – which has limited material resources and whose supporters will be in danger – that is trying to bring down a powerful dictatorship. In contrast, the dictatorship usually will have access to vast material resources, organizational strength, and ability to perpetrate brutalities.

“To plan a strategy” here means to calculate a course of action that will make it more likely to get from the present to the desired future situation. In terms of this discussion, it means from a dictatorship to a future democratic system. A plan to achieve that objective will usually consist of a phased series of campaigns and other organized activities designed to strengthen the oppressed population and society and to weaken the dictatorship. Note here that the objective is not simply to destroy the current dictatorship but to emplace a democratic system. A grand strategy that limits its objective to merely destroying the incumbent dictatorship runs a great risk of producing another tyrant.*

Agree with Sharp’s views or not, he has done an enormous amount of work on nonviolent means of revolution, and has been very influential in various movements around the world. (If you have the opportunity to see the recent documentary about him, How to Start a Revolution, I definitely recommend doing so). He frames it in such a way that invites you to consider nonviolence as a serious approach, not a refuge of weakness, and makes a strong case for at least taking it seriously as an option.

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* Sharp’s warnings about planning for the aftermath have a great deal of resonance, too, when considering the current situation in Egypt, to name one.

While spontaneity has some positive qualities, it has often had disadvantages. Frequently, the democratic resisters have not anticipated the brutalities of the dictatorship, so that they suffered gravely and the resistance has collapsed. At times the lack of planning by democrats has left crucial decisions to chance, with disastrous results. Even when the oppressive system was brought down, lack of planning on how to handle the transition to a democratic system has contributed to the emergence of a new dictatorship.

Posted in War | 2 Comments