Up on Foreign Affairs right now is a piece by Paul McGeough, the latest in a series of stories to appear in the media over the last couple of months about the succession of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the pre-eminent Shiite religious leader in the world. Like previous stories on this subject, it primarily focuses on Iran’s efforts to influence - or co-opt - the succession through its candidate Ayatollah Shahroudi, who has set up offices in Najaf and has been busy buying influence among junior clerics with Iranian money and meeting with the likes of Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki, who would love to have more influence with Sistani’s successor than he does with the independent-minded Sistani.
I’ve written about this before, but there are some things worth addressing in this piece. I didn’t have a lot of quibbles with it overall, but there are a few places where it misses or comes up short.
First, the article gives the impression that Sistani’s succession is an all-or-nothing proposition, that whoever succeeds him will be the spiritual leader for all Shia everywhere.
As many as 100 junior ayatollahs will have a role in selecting the next spiritual leader. Loosely the equivalent of the Christian rank of bishops, they command a following among the faithful that translates into lobbying power.
However, the way it’s described is misleading. A Shiite marja is not like the Catholic Pope. Many people will of course follow the guidance of clerics, but each individual may choose his or her own marja from among all qualified and willing individuals. Sistani is certainly the most widely influential marja, but he is not the only one and it is not a given that in the event of his death, all of his followers would go to one successor. In fact, with the lack of a clear successor in Najaf, and the controversial nature of Shahroudi’s position on velayat-e faqih (the Iranian system of governance by jurisprudent), it is a distinct possibility that there would be a split, with a portion of Sistani’s followers going to Shahroudi and a portion going to someone else, such as al-Hakim.
McGeough also stops short while delving into the question of financial influence in the succession. He discusses the Iranian money Shahroudi has been throwing around - and that can certainly provide the chosen candidate with a significant boost - but there are other wealthy and influential organizations that can have a say in the succession.
Part of the job of a marja is to collect funds from his followers (sometimes both the khums and zakat, which amount roughly to a tithe and alms respectively and can add up to quite a significant amount of money) and distribute them to the needy. An influential marja generally has a large foundation that oversees clinics, schools, orphanages, community centers, hospitals - a range of charitable institutions. He will also have a network of junior clerics who are empowered to collect on his behalf and who serve as his agents (wakils) in different areas where he holds or seeks to hold influence. I know this is getting a little into the nerdy details, but here’s the point. When a marja dies, his network and foundation don’t just go away; and when a major internationally influential marja dies, he can leave behind a pretty large and wealthy network; and when that marja is greatly respected, even revered, people will pay attention to what his foundation does.
Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, Sistani’s teacher and predecessor, left behind a very large and influential foundation, which supported Sistani according to al-Khoei’s explicitly stated wishes. This foundation, still large, wealthy, and respected, will be in a position to give a boost to its chosen candidate, as will Sistani’s own foundation, just to name a few other possible players.
Historically the Najaf hawza has preferred to stay out of politics and has preferred that politics stay out of it. Even if Iran and Maliki’s government in Iraq throw their weight behind Shahroudi, it doesn’t mean he will come out on top in the succession contest. It might just be that no one does.
h/t to Sina Kashefipour, also known as @rejectionking, for linking me to this piece, and for many interesting conversations on this subject.
