Monthly Archives: April 2012

Well played, Marine Corps

Last week it was announced that the USMC will be allowing women to attend its infantry training programs, beginning with the Infantry Officers’ Course and later expanding to training opportunities for enlisted women. While this doesn’t mean that female Marines who complete the training would now be allowed into combat roles, it is still a big step, and a smart move by the Marine Corps.

Many people feel at this point that it is inevitable that our military will have full equality of opportunity. This step seems to be an indication that the Marine Corps certainly thinks so. By starting to filter women into infantry training now, the Corps is putting itself in position to be able to implement immediately when that time comes.

More importantly in the short term, it allows the Marines to take the next step in the exploration of lifting the ban on women in combat that has been going on for more than a year. A close look at standards, an assessment of what is truly required in order for combat units to be effective, will be an important step. The Marine Corps Times reports that “new functional fitness tests are being developed to help Marine Corps leaders determine how women and men perform in, and cope with, various combat tasks. The goal is to establish “gender-neutral” physical fitness standards.” Incorporating women into infantry training programs allows the Corps to test and refine these standards in a hands on manner with real men and women, and doing so now, before there is any directive requiring women to be allowed in combat units, gives them time to do this the right way.

I have stated before that I think women should have the same opportunities as men to serve in our military, provided they can meet the necessary standards to ensure the maximum possible safety and effectiveness of our combat forces. It’s great to see the USMC taking serious and responsible steps toward this.

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The Growing Threat to Saudi Intellectuals: The Case of Hamza Kashgari

This guest post is by Lauren Morgan, a writer and analyst from Indiana whose research primarily focuses on regional politics in the Middle East and homegrown terrorism. Since 2009, Lauren has worked as an analyst with the Joint Terrorism Task Force. She holds a degree in Middle Eastern Studies and is a former resident of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. She can be reached via Twitter @lemorgan.

Hamza Kashgari, a Saudi writer and poet, created a firestorm of controversy on Milad an-Nabi, the anniversary of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, when he took to his personal Twitter account, which has since been deleted, and said the following:

  • On your birthday, I will say that I have loved the rebel in you, that you’ve always been a source of inspiration to me, and that I do not like the halos of divinity around you. I shall not pray for you.
  • On your birthday, I find you wherever I turn. I will say that I have loved aspects of you, hated others, and could not understand many more.
  • On your birthday, I shall not bow to you. I shall not kiss your hand. Rather, I shall shake it as equals do, and smile at you as you smile at me. I shall speak to you as a friend, no more.

Despite the obvious poetic nature of his comments, they enraged conservative Saudi clerics who declared him an apostate and called for King Abdullah to execute the twenty-three year old. Kashgari fled the Kingdom and entered Malaysia on February 7. Two days later, as Kashgari was preparing to leave Malaysia for New Zealand, Malaysian authorities detained him and subsequently deported him to Saudi Arabia, where his fate remains uncertain.

Kashgari made his initial court appearance on March 7 and entered his tawbah (repentance) to the Saudi court system, according to Fadiah Nadwa, the representative for Lawyers for Liberty (LFL) who was contacted by Kashgari’s friend and traveling companion to try to halt Kashgari’s deportation from Malaysia. The courts, however, have given no indication whether his tawbah was accepted, and Nadwa notes that there are cases where defendants, despite entering their tawbah, have remained in detention for years without trial. Since his arrest, Kashgari reportedly has been kept in solitary confinement and denied access to his attorney, renowned Saudi human rights lawyer Abdulrahman Allahim, though Arab News reports that Allahim and Kashgari’s family attended the initial court appearance.

Media attention has been minimal and broadly inaccurate, but the importance of Kashgari’s case as a precedent for similar free speech cases in the Kingdom cannot be overstated. In the past month alone, another Saudi resident, Mohamed Salama, has been accused of apostasy, with many parallels being drawn between his case and Kashgari’s. In addition, well-known Saudi human rights activist and lawyer Walid Abu Al-Khair was banned from traveling to the U.S. at the end of March; he is accused by the religious establishment of being influential to Kashgari. The State Department has issued a statement saying they are “seeking clarification” on the travel ban.

Was Hamza Kashgari Targeted for Arrest?

Since his arrest, rumors have swirled online that the government targeted Kashgari for arrest long before he tweeted the now infamous words about the Prophet. Muath Aldabbagh first met Kashgari four years ago at a gathering led by Abdullah Hamiduddin, a scholar of Yemeni descent known for opinions that differ from the standard Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. After becoming acquainted through Hamiduddin’s circle, Kashgari and Aldabbagh met weekly with a small group to discuss philosophy at coffee shops and homes across Jeddah.

Aldabbagh explained in an interview that Kashgari had recently abandoned the strict religious dogmatism that permeates Saudi society. He emphatically defended Kashgari against critics’ claims that he is an apostate, however, saying that Kashgari is “still within religion, trying to appreciate it in his own way.” Aldabbagh believes Kashgari’s youth and popularity as a newspaper columnist has made him an ideal target for a religious establishment that has become increasingly nervous about the rise of Saudi intellectuals in recent years. He notes that “different groups, such as mine and other groups, have been discussing intellectual matters and taking knowledge into our own hands.” In a country where free thought and critical thinking are not welcomed by the religious establishment, attending groups like the one that Kashgari and Aldabbagh frequented puts these intellectuals at risk for retribution.

The repeated deceptions committed by officials involved with the detention and deportation of Kashgari further validate Aldabbagh’s suspicions that Kashgari was targeted. Malaysian authorities have been intentionally deceptive on multiple occasions about the arrest of Kashgari. Malaysia’s Home Minister intentionally deceived reporters by stating that Kashgari’s detention was at the request of Interpol; Interpol has since strongly denied this claim. Fadiah Nadwa of LFL spoke with me at length about the chaotic scene that developed at the airport in Kuala Lumpur as she and other LFL representatives tried, unsuccessfully, to halt Malaysian officials from deporting Kashgari. She said that lawyers served papers to airport officials to stop the deportation, but police and authorities deceived them in order to prevent the court order from being enacted. In addition, Nadwa claims that when LFL asked to check Kashgari’s immigration report, Malaysian immigration officials claimed there was no record of Kashgari ever entering the country. LFL has since issued a statement and photograph confirming Kashgari’s entrance into the country.

A New Witch Hunt?

Kashgari’s case has evoked a renewed sense of fear amongst activists who have been utilizing social media, and Twitter in particular, to speak openly about rights issues in the Kingdom for the past few years. That Kashgari was arrested just months after Crown Prince Nayef’s ascension is not lost on Saudi activists. If Kashgari was targeted for arrest, it confirms the fears expressed by liberal Saudis following the ascension of Prince Nayef to the position of Crown Prince in October 2011. Then, Saudis took to Twitter to tweet #NayefNightmares - the fears (some real and some humorous) they had about his increased power and influence in the country due to his reputation as a social conservative with strong ties to the religious establishment.

Indeed, more than one activist I interviewed agreed to speak to me only on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal. According to one, “the fear for many liberal Saudis isn’t to be labeled an activist anymore. The fear is that you are labeled an atheist.” Aldabbagh echoed this claim, noting that the religious establishment recognizes that “liberal has now become mainstream. Their enemy right now is atheism. Anyone who is against them, they label him as being an atheist.” He admits he has received numerous threats following Kashgari’s arrest from individuals who have warned him “you’re next”.

Conclusion

Kashgari’s case could set a dangerous legal precedent for free speech in Saudi Arabia. It also illustrates the far-reaching influence of the Saudi regime. As Saudi activist Hala al-Dosari notes, “We’ve never had someone brought from overseas to be prosecuted for speaking against Islam.” It is troubling that Kashgari was deported back to Saudi Arabia despite the Kingdom not having an extradition agreement with Malaysia and despite Kashgari having broken no laws in Malaysia.

Equally troubling is the lack of legal movement on Kashgari’s case within Saudi Arabia. Despite publicly retracting his comments and entering tawbah to the Saudi courts, Kashgari’s detention continues. But Nadwa remains optimistic, saying “the fact that he’s not been tried yet is a good indication for us. I think the pressure is really working.” Still, others fear that the government, under pressure from the religious establishment, will try to make an example out of him. “We fear that he will be a scapegoat,” said Saudi activist Hala al-Dosari in an interview.

The only acceptable conclusion to this case is Kashgari’s immediate and unconditional release from custody. To ensure that the regime does not bow to clerics’ calls for Kashgari’s execution, the international community must demand that the Saudi regime release him at once. Many Saudi activists agree that the Saudi regime is sensitive to international pressure and does not want negative publicity; Fadiah Nadwa emphasized the urgent need for international attention to Kashgari’s case, saying, “It’s very important for us to step in now and increase the pressure so that they won’t step in and execute him. I think we have to be fast in our actions.”

I would like to give special thanks to Hala al-Dosari, Hasan Radwan, and Daveed Gartenstein-Ross for their assistance in bringing this article to fruition.

Posted in Human Rights, Middle East, Saudi Arabia | Tagged , , , , , | 3 Comments

Coups and the politics of security assistance

During the recent coup in Mali, the United States received some unfortunate news: Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, the nominal leader of the rebellious faction of the country’s military, was trained in the United States under the auspices of the Department of State’s International Military Education and Training program. While military aid to the country – aimed primarily at countering al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb – has been suspended, the presence of an American-trained officer in an American-supported military at the forefront of a coup d’etat is a troubling sign for a U.S. foreign policy which would rather pride itself on democratic 21st century statecraft rather than what seems like 20th century skullduggery.

As anachronistic and self-contradictory as the idea of a 21st century coup d’etat may seem to modern observers (although let’s not forget Honduras), it remains as an extreme expression of political engagement that lies beneath the surface even in nominally democratic, transparent societies. Moreover, understanding this political dynamic is crucial in an age when the United States increasingly seeks to leverage and enhance the combat power of its foreign partners.

The Abnormal Situation

Armed forces and security services are, in theory and often in practice, instruments of power. But they are also nodes of power all their own. Their actions can make or break political transitions. Like all bureaucracies, they exert a degree of independent influence and compete for resources and power within a larger political system. However, because they are armed and highly cohesive, they have a unique capability to coercively implement and resist political change. Indeed, militaries are fundamentally political institutions because they are organizations charged with carrying out the ugly side of political behavior.

In a rational-legalistic state, military power exists in the shadow of legislative and deliberative machinery that guides its loyal military force. But militaries often exist to neutralize political conflict within the domestic sphere and enforce the basic rules of the game that make civic engagement possible. Even René Schneider, the 1970 Chilean Army Commander-in-Chief remembered for his resistance to military interference in Chilean politics, recognized that the apolitical role of the military was a political decision in favor of the status quo thus ensuring a normal political process. But Schneider added a caveat: “the only limitation is in the case that the State stopped acting within their own legality. In that case the armed forces have a higher loyalty to the people and are free to decide an abnormal situation beyond the framework of the law.”

In Honduras, for example, the Constitution contained no impeachment process and explicitly stated that the military was responsible for the alternation of the presidency. In Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) was critical to the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, yet crafted a constitutional order in which the military retains an implicit veto on any changes to the parameters of Egypt’s burgeoning democratic political system. In both cases, the militaries in question had received large degrees of U.S. support.

The Articulation of Loathsome Interests

In Mali, U.S. support created more capable elements of the Malian military, but it was unable to alter the broader patronage system within Mali itself. Despite U.S. efforts, Toure’s considerations for his patronage network overall supported diverting resources away from the military. As Alex Thurston and other analysts have noted, this has had deleterious consequences for the military’s response to the Tuareg rebellion and the overall conditions of mid-ranking officers and soldiers in the field. The political cooption of high-ranking officers by the regime is an important strategy for regime stability, but if it occurs without buying off the parts of the military who ultimately provide the men on the scene with guns, it is an invitation for a junior officer coup, bringing about men with the notional ability to enforce their rule but limited capacity to enact it substantively. Political complexity does not imply nor require sophistication on the part of all the players involved, but when a shock to the system occurs, the modus vivendi that made loathsome interests mutually compatible can rapidly disappear.

Foreign support and the leverage it brings is inherently bounded in its capabilities to effect systemic political change. Arming and training a foreign military force might improve its capabilities on the battlefield and its organizational cohesion, but it only complicates and does not neutralize or affect its status as a political actor. Rather than buying an effective civil-military system, foreign support tends to exacerbate existing political cleavages within the security sector rather than transcend them. As political scientists Jeffrey Herbst and William Reno have noted, African politics in particular provide strong case studies of how the traditional links between military and state strength can be perverted or severed. Militaries are only useful tools for state formation to the extent they require mass mobilization, resource extraction, and provide genuinely public goods. If they can gain their resources through domestic extortion, foreign institutional or political support, or otherwise avoid an inclusive economic relationship with local territory, they may not function as engines of stabilization.

For example, the Organization for African Unity’s commitment to de jure sovereignty has significantly reduced African regimes’ fears of external conquest, while vast flows of military and non-military foreign aid have reduced incentives to mobilize resources from the construction of strong extractive state institutions. Indeed, combined with pressure to encourage competitive politics, the development of strong state institutions is a particularly risky prospect, and many weak states have moved to develop “shadow states” and prevent the creation of institutions that might use their effective provision of public goods to challenge the authority of present regimes.

In other words, the strengthening of military institutions can undermine the deliberate strategies of weakening or decentralization of violent power. An under-resourced military reduces the potential that a military will compete with the government as an independent power base and makes officers more dependent on a centralized patronage network. In some cases, enhancing military capabilities can gravely disrupt a regime’s intentional constraints on power. How foreign powers can effectively provide military aid while simultaneously strengthening state institutions remains an open question. In pure proxy warfare, the goal of strengthening state institutions, encouraging political competition, and enabling the conditions for the provision of public goods are all basically irrelevant or secondary considerations. The goal was to check the power of rival forces, period. Now, however, the goal is to build state institutions, albeit from afar and with a limited footprint.

Defense Cooperation and Unintended Consequences

On the other hand, there are beneficial aspects of engaging with military forces without quashing their prior political roles within or outside of the state, provided expectations are properly limited. In countries with weak or volatile governing institutions, forging relationships with militaries and security services can provide a more enduring avenue of influence with greater longevity and institutional retention than other elements of the regime can provide. But relationships with foreign militaries must be built with awareness of their political incentives.

As the United States enlists foreign states in the suppression of terrorism and subversion, it must recognize the political dimension of those states’ militaries. In post-withdrawal Iraq, Nuri al-Maliki has already been able to manipulate the security institutions the U.S. left behind to create a highly personalized, coup-proofed force operating at his disposal. Meanwhile, in Yemen, U.S. trained counterterrorism forces have frequently been used in service of defending Saleh and his successor regime. American leverage is temporary, but the political institutions and capabilities that this supposedly leveraging cooperation creates will long outlast the U.S. policymakers’ and public’s attention spans.

The U.S. must acknowledge that foreign security forces do not necessarily represent popular or elite sovereignty, but rather constitute political actors in their own right. In many cases, their machinations carry weight in economic, political, and civil arenas U.S. citizens might not recognize as subject to military influence. Building a military is not simply a technocratic endeavor which teleologically results in a capable, apolitical force, but an intervention in a complex political process and the empowerment of political actors. Coups, as the extreme case of an enduring form of political-military behavior in domestic politics, should not be dismissed as anachronisms or relics from a bygone era. Instead, they are reminders that as the U.S. seeks to stand up partners, measured considerations of U.S. priorities and appreciation for the convoluted nature of deep politics remains as important as ever.

Posted in Civil-Military Relations | 1 Comment

The Last Great Phantom Threat

Yesterday I wrote about a graphic posted to jihadi forums that garnered some media attention. In it, New York City’s famous skyline at sunset was overlaid with the text: “Al Qaeda: Coming Soon Again in New York.” The print media interpreted the graphic as a possible threat; on Fox News, Rep. Peter King was reportedly shown the image and asked if another attack was coming. I cautioned in my initial New York Daily News column and blog entry that the chance of this being the prelude to another large-scale attack was quite low. “With the recent disruption of large-scale plots, al Qaeda’s need for secrecy will only grow,” I wrote. “The chance of some low-level figure knowing enough about an upcoming plot connected to al Qaeda’s core to post a Photoshopped graphic boasting of it in advance is infinitesimally small.” It turned out, when more information came in, that the graphic wasn’t even a threat at all: if you read the Arabic-language introduction where this photo was posted on jihadi forums, it specifies that the graphic is actually a lesson in Photoshopping.

I got into an interesting discussion on Twitter thereafter about the effectiveness of terrorist threats (because they can garner media attention and either scare people or divert policing resources even when, as with the New York graphic, they are either phantom threats or not really threats at all). I think the conventional wisdom on this point is that jihadis have a relatively easy time getting the media to hype non-existent threats. As is so often the case, I took a position contrary to the conventional wisdom: I think the media’s hyping of questionable terrorist threats is in fact less common than is generally perceived.

To be sure, at one point amorphous threats received a disproportionate amount of national media coverage. But I think the general perception of how often this happens was set relatively early after the 9/11 attacks, when terror alerts were common and the media would devote a great deal of attention to each one. Since 2006, you would be hard pressed to name many examples of inordinate national media attention to threats that don’t exist. The New York City graphic is a recent example, but the kind of attention it garnered honestly isn’t all that impressive. Back in September, more attention than I would have liked was devoted to an alleged plot that would coincide with the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. A militant had fed the bogus story of a new plot to American officials, and it was widely reported. But before that? You would be hard pressed to name the last time, prior to September 2011, that a phantom threat truly received disproportionate national media attention.

In October 2010, a plot to carry out multiple Mumbai-style plots in Europe received a great deal of media coverage — but this represented a disrupted plot, and a large-scale one, rather than a hyped phantom threat. In the summer of 2010, I appeared on a rather remarkable Fox Business segment premised on the idea that “as many as hundreds of members” of Shabaab were slipping into the U.S. through its southern border (the other guest accused me of secretly aiding Shabaab when I cast doubt on that dubious assertion). But that segment can hardly be considered a major national media storm.

My point is not that phantom or amorphous threats do not get hyped — they do — but rather that this doesn’t happen as frequently as most people who follow terrorism closely perceive to be the case. Just as the point of not hyping amorphous threats is that we shouldn’t lose our sense of perspective, we also shouldn’t lose our sense of perspective about the media’s tendency to hype such incidents: it has happened far, far less frequently since the first five years of the “global war on terror.”

In fact, I think we can pinpoint the last great phantom threat with some precision. I believe it occurred in October 2006, when a warning was posted to the Internet message board 4chan that “America’s Hiroshima” was imminent. The message stated:

On Sunday, October 22nd, 2006, there will be seven “dirty” explosive devices detonated in seven different U.S. cities; Miami, New York City, Atlanta, Seattle, Houston, Oakland and Cleveland. The death toll will approach 100,000 from the initial blasts and countless other fatalities will later occur as a result from radioactive fallout.

These dirty bomb explosions would allegedly take place at NFL stadiums, during the games. The 2006 midterm elections were just around the corner, and Media Matters (an organization with which I have considerable political disagreement) has a decent rundown of the kind of media attention this threat received. “CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC dedicated a considerable amount of airtime to a purported threat to NFL stadiums in seven cities,” Media Matters stated. The Media Matters writeup notes that I was interviewed about this threat — appearing on Fox News’s The Big Story — but I wish it had also reported on the content of my appearance, if only because it departed significantly from the cautious way that other commentators treated this “news” item. I said on air that we could be absolutely certain that this threat was bogus — for the same reasons that we could be certain the “Coming Soon Again in New York” graphic wasn’t our first warning of another 9/11. Leave aside the ridiculous claim that the initial death toll from seven dirty bomb blasts would be 100,000 — it most definitely would not — and it is still obvious that this threat was a hoax. Quite simply, if al Qaeda was really prepared to set off dirty bombs simultaneously in seven different cities, would some chump who’d go bragging about the operation on 4chan really be given advance notice? I guess there’s the possibility that this could have been an official al Qaeda announcement — but given the fact that the jihadi group had just seen a large-scale plot disrupted (the August 2006 transatlantic air plot), would it really provide such specific information about where it would strike, such that authorities’ chance of disrupting the plot would be maximized? And if we want to assume that this might have been an official al Qaeda announcement, since when had 4chan, of all places, become al Qaeda’s go-to channel for communication?

A few seconds of thought could thus easily reveal that there was no meat to this story, and I said as much on the air. But the NFL “plot” is so much more hilarious when you know the actual back story. This wasn’t the phantom threat of committed jihadis or their supporters. Rather, the 4chan message was the work of Wisconsin resident Jake Brahm, who was at the time living with his parents and working part-time at a grocery store. Essentially, he was bored and wanted to see if he could cause a bit of a stir by making some juvenile online threats. Before that, Brahm was best known for keeping a personal blog of his masturbatory habits entitled “Jake Brahm Wangs Da Poo.” Sadly, it’s no longer available online — but really, you probably didn’t want to read it in the first place. Brahm ultimately plead guilty to willfully conveying false information, and was sentenced to six months in federal prison. This is the man who briefly scared the whole country:

I think Media Matters was right to link the excessive coverage of Brahm’s self-evidently bogus threat to the 2006 midterm elections. But the bottom line is that this media attention didn’t swing the election, at all. The Republicans, at the time generally considered the tougher of the two parties on terrorism, were trounced at the ballot box; and the media looked awfully silly for how much time it devoted to Brahm’s little cry for attention.

This is a decidedly non-scientific judgment, but I think an analysis of the media’s coverage of vague, amorphous terrorist threats would reveal Brahm’s NFL warning to be the last great phantom threat. I’m not saying that threats have never been hyped since, but rather that to me October 2006 seems to represent the apex of the practice, with terror alerts and random but suggestive data points garnering declining attention thereafter.

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Is al Qaeda Coming Soon to New York?

Yesterday, the New York Daily News asked me to write about a new graphic posted to jihadi forums that has garnered a bit of media attention. The graphic depicts New York City, along with the promise that al Qaeda will be “coming soon again.” The resulting Daily News column can be read here. Space limits for print publications being what they are, I am posting a somewhat more fleshed out (yet still short) version of my thoughts here at Gunpowder & Lead.

An image posted on jihadi forums Monday caught the NYPD’s interest as a possible threat. In it, the city’s famous skyline at sunset is overlaid with the text: “Al Qaeda: Coming Soon Again in New York.” What are we to make of this? Is it a legitimate threat?

The chances are that this is mere braggadocio, not something that should scare New Yorkers. And it is virtually certain that this does not presage a large-scale attack, à la 9/11.

NYPD director of intelligence Mitchell Silber provides a powerful framework for understanding what we mean by “al Qaeda plots” in his new book The Al Qaeda Factor. Silber identifies three categories for considering al Qaeda’s role: plots where the core leadership exercised command and control, those that the leadership suggested or endorsed, and those where the core served merely an inspirational role.

Plots connected to the core leadership in a command and control capacity are our greatest terrorism concern because the leadership, at its strongest, can muster the kind of resources and pair the kind of skill sets that could pose a risk of a catastrophic strike. In recent years, two such large-scale plots have been disrupted in Western countries. In August 2006, authorities apprehended more than twenty suspects who plotted to blow up seven transatlantic flights bound for the U.S. from Britain using liquid explosives. In October 2010, a plot was disrupted in Europe that involved “urban warfare” attacks.

Al Qaeda’s central leadership has long exercised very careful operational security: many 9/11 hijackers did not even know their mission until the day of those attacks. With the recent disruption of large-scale plots, al Qaeda’s need for secrecy will only grow. The chance of some low-level figure knowing enough about an upcoming plot connected to al Qaeda’s core to post a Photoshopped graphic boasting of it in advance is infinitesimally small.

There are, however, other possibilities. One is homegrown or lone wolf terrorists unconnected to al Qaeda’s core: think, for example, of infamous Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan. Such attackers fall into the category enumerated by Silber wherein al Qaeda plays merely an inspirational role.

The second, and far likelier, possibility is that this is bluster. Even a lone wolf may get caught if he shows his hand too early. And jihadis, along with their supporters, realize that bluster may actually serve a strategic purpose: phantom threats can keep Western countries on their toes, making them pour more resources into playing defense against the threat of terrorism.

Update, 1:20 p.m.: The lack of threat represented by this photo is even clearer now than it was last night, when I wrote my analysis on a rather tight deadline. If you look at the Arabic-language introduction where this photo was posted on jihadi forums, it specifies that the graphic is a lesson in Photoshopping; it wasn’t intended as a threat in the first place, but the media ended up reporting it that way. Thanks to Rusty at The Jawa Report for drawing this to my attention; here is his writeup.

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