Monthly Archives: October 2011

Changes Are No Good

I finally got around to reading Stephen Walt’s latest essay “The End of the American Era” from the current issue of The National Interest over the weekend. Walt joins the growing chorus of academics calling for an American grand strategy that’s more offshore balancing and less primacy. Rather than offer my own long-winded diatribe on the merits of offshore balancing, I want to throw a couple questions out there for discussion.

In his opening paragraph, Walt offers up the conventional wisdom on the merits of primacy during a bygone era:

The United States has been the dominant world power since 1945, and U.S. leaders have long sought to preserve that privileged position. They understood, as did most Americans, that primacy brought important benefits. It made other states less likely to threaten America or its vital interests directly. By dampening great-power competition and giving Washington the capacity to shape regional balances of power, primacy contributed to a more tranquil international environment. That tranquility fostered global prosperity; investors and traders operate with greater confidence when there is less danger of war. Primacy also gave the United States the ability to work for positive ends: promoting human rights and slowing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It may be lonely at the top, but Americans have found the view compelling.

I asked myself the following questions after reading this paragraph:

1. Does primacy actually foster a more tranquil global environment?

2. Given that primacy nests so well within American exceptionalism, will it be possible to abandon this endeavor? In other words, can Americans accept the idea of not being on top?

What do you think?

Posted in Military, Strategery, War | 4 Comments

Sebastian Junger at Sanders Theater

The Cambridge Reads book of the year was Sebastian Junger’s War, and tonight he appeared in Memorial Auditorium at the Sanders Theater at Harvard to talk about it and take questions. Junger also grew up in the area (and his Mom was at the event tonight - he asked her to cover her ears at one point before he described being half a second away from being hit square by an IED). I thought some people might be interested in a lot of what he said, but I didn’t want to spam the Twitter streams of those who are not interested, so I’m sharing my notes here. To those of you who have read War, some - although not all - of this might be familiar. Please note that for the most part these are not direct quotes, but close approximations, as I was taking notes in a little Moleskine and not recording the whole talk. Where I’m sure of a direct quote, it is in quotes.

On Afghanistan

If we had dedicated the kind of energy that we did to an unnecessary war (in Iraq) to Afghanistan, I don’t think there would even be a war there right now.

We’ve only really been at war there for 5 or 6 years. There was very little violence until 2005 or so. By 2007, I knew we’d be there for a long, long time. The contradiction is now, if we left, it would get much, much worse. It would go back to a state of civil war like it was in in the 90s.

On the Korengal Valley

It was so beautiful. It looked like Colorado, this deep valley and high mountains.

In the time that Battle Company was there, 20% of all combat in Afghanistan was happening in that one six-mile valley. The 150 men in the Korengal were absorbing 20% of all combat for 70,000 NATO forces.

In their first 24 hours at Restrepo, there were 13 firefights.

On War

A contradiction: every civil war I’ve ever covered has been ended by an act of war, that is to say by the use or threat of violence. I don’t know what to think about that.

Bullets travel faster than sound. If someone is shooting at you from 400 yards, you hear the bullets before you hear the gunshots.

Tired is a choice, in a sense. Falling behind because you’re tired is saying ‘I’d rather hurt a little less and put everyone in a little more danger.’ A lot of pain is mental, a lot of limitation.

“Wars are decided by politicians. Wars are decided by civilians, by us.”

On Soldiers

The male energy of conflict, if you change its DNA by just a few sequences, becomes brotherhood. They are that close.

I had always covered war from a civilian perspective. As a journalist, I covered the human cost of war, but soldiers pay that price, too. They might look scary with their armor and guns, but they don’t have emotional armor. Your kid in high school, they have exactly as much emotional armor as he does. If your kid’s friend is killed in a car accident, what he goes through, a soldier goes through the same thing when he loses a brother. Except where it probably seems less likely to your kid that he will die in a car accident the next week, it seems more likely to a soldier that he’ll be killed.

As soldiers would put it ‘I get that this is war and people get killed, but I don’t get why it’s the best guys that get killed.’ That’s what’s so evil about it to them, that on some fundamental level, it doesn’t make sense. They struggle with the meaninglessness of that. They struggle with retaining the sense that existence has meaning in the face of that.

It’s hard for a 20-year-old to understand how to reconcile their feelings when they miss combat. War is a terrible thing. When soldiers go home and they miss it, there’s a feeling for some of them like ‘If I miss something terrible, then I must be terrible.’

Brotherhood can’t be recreated if your life doesn’t depend on it. You might have friendships - if you really like someone, and you become good friends, you’ll do anything for them. Brotherhood has nothing to do with feelings. When you’re in a firefight, you can’t be wondering if the guy next to you is going to have your back. Two guys could hate each other, but brotherhood means they’ll still die for each other.

On women in combat

It’s not about shooting a machine gun - anyone can shoot a machine gun - it’s more just carrying a heavy load. You have to be able to keep up carrying 150 pounds. That’s hard for most men, and women have 30% less muscle mass. If you can’t pass that test, you’re not going in there anyway.

It’s a self-selecting group, people that are in forward combat positions. You have to really want it. Any woman that ended up in such a position would be just the same as a man.

When you’re in combat, whatever your background, you have to conform to certain norms, very masculine norms, norms that maximize the survival of the group. A woman in a combat unit would have to conform, too, so essentially I think a woman in a combat unit would basically become a man.

A woman in a combat unit with 30 guys would be under tremendous psychological strain. The isolation of that. And there’s no privacy.

There are women helicopter pilots and actually the men loved the female pilots. They were much more aggressive than the male pilots, more protective. If we were in trouble, they wouldn’t ask questions, they’d just shoot.

On Tim Hetherington

After Tim died, I got a letter from a Vietnam vet who said, ‘you guys came really close to getting what war is really like, but you missed. The thing about war is not that you might die, it’s knowing that you will lose your brothers. You couldn’t understand that then, but you’ve lost a brother now. Now you know the one thing that war is really about.’ Once you know the one thing that war is really about, a lot of people either are drawn to it more, or want to get as far away from it as possible. I’m one of the latter.

Currently working on a film about Hetherington for HBO.

Also, in closing, after describing Hetherington’s death, Junger talked about an organization he is working on starting (and warned ‘it’s almost ready, but don’t look for it on the internet or anything. You won’t find it. It doesn’t exist yet’) in honor of Hetherington called Reporters Instructed in Saving Colleagues (or RISC), which will provide training in combat medicine to freelance journalists. It will be offered each year in New York, London, and Beirut, and will provide for free the kind of training soldiers get in basic battlefield medical care. I believe he also said that journalists who take part will be given free room and board for the three days of the training. The first such course is planned for April 20, the anniversary of Hetherington’s death, in New York.
———

I really enjoyed the talk. Junger is a good speaker, with good pace, good presence, and a dry sense of humor. Most of the questions asked during the Q&A period were actually quite good, and led to some interesting moments. I want to close this post with my favorite thing Junger said. He was talking about the idea of brotherhood, and about some of the challenges in transitioning back to civilian life. In regular life, he said, you are judged by many things that are out of your control - where you went to school, what your parents did for a living, whether you’re gay or straight, how tall you are, etc.; in combat, what you are judged by is within your control - it’s whether you will put your own life at risk for your brothers.

Here’s what he said:

“The decision to be brave is something that is available to all of us.” There are only two things that I believe are fully in everyone’s own control. “Everyone has the capacity to be courageous, and everyone has the capacity to be compassionate.” If you don’t choose to be, it’s just on you.

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Bad Moon Rising

Continuing my streak of being able to talk (un)intelligently about only two things, I’ve got an essay up at Foreign Affairs on Iranian naval developments and expansion.

While much of the world’s attention focuses on Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran has made considerable progress on another security front in recent years — steadily increasing the reach and lethality of its naval forces. The goal by 2025, if all goes as the country has planned, is to have a navy that can deploy anywhere within a strategic triangle from the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea to the Strait of Malacca.

Should such plans materialize — and Iran is making steady progress — Tehran would redraw the strategic calculus of an already volatile region. The Persian Gulf is home to some of the world’s most valuable supply lines, routes that are vital to the global energy supply. In the last few years, Iran has invested heavily in a domestic defense industry that now has the ability to produce large-scale warships, submarines, and missiles.

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Iran has largely pursued a strategy of deterrence. Its ground forces, which number roughly 450,000, are trained and equipped to fight a prolonged, asymmetric defensive battle on its own territory. Likewise, Iran’s air force can protect high value domestic targets such as the Natanz uranium enrichment facility and numerous military and political headquarters inside Tehran; it is incapable of long-range strike missions abroad. Iran simply does not possess the capability to project hard power into neighboring states.

But Iran’s navy is different. It is the best organized, best trained, and best equipped service of the country’s conventional military establishment. More than a nuclear weapons program, which would likely function as a passive deterrent, Iran’s navy is an active component of Iran’s activist foreign policy. The country’s leadership, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has repeatedly said that Iran’s navy is the critical foundation on which its long-term development and prosperity rests.

You can read the rest of it here.

Posted in War | 2 Comments

White House Picketed by 5 Pashtoons

In doing archival research for a new historical article we’re co-authoring on Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, my colleague Tara Vassefi came across the following article that was published on May 30, 1961, in the Chicago Daily Tribune:

White House Picketed by 5 Pashtoons

Washington, May 29 (AP)-A small and remote but intense nationalist movement was brought today to the doorstep of President Kennedy, who was away tending to more pressing matters.

Five Pashtoon pickets carried banners in front of the White House protesting: “Stop Pakistan from bombarding Pashtoons with American weapons.”

The homeland of the Pashtoon, or Pakhtun, peoples, lies on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan, partly in each country. It is in the Khyber pass area where Pakistani planes often bomb intrusions by Afghan fighting men.

There is so much that I love about this article, beginning with the fact that in 1961 five people picketing outside the White House was somehow considered national news (remember, this was picked up by a Chicago paper). In part, this is demonstrative of where American culture stood at the time. Obviously, the 1960s and 1970s saw a protest culture emerge in the U.S., but in 1961 a protest held by five people could make national news. (The exoticism of the “Pashtoons” and their cause likely also had something to do with this.)

I also can’t help but wonder how the reporter who wrote this piece decided that the topic for his next story would be a protest held by five Pashtuns. Did he walk past the protest and find himself curious about the five men mounting a quixotic protest related to an exotic land? Or did a Pashtun association send a press release around town, hyping a protest which ultimately only five picketers attended?

I also appreciate the archaic rendering of “Pashtoons,” as well as the frank way that the reporter ended the first paragraph, noting that President Kennedy was “away tending to more pressing matters.” President Kennedy was, of course, not one to always spend his time productively. But regardless, the notion that he was tending to more pressing matters at the time is almost certainly the case.

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Shades of Gray

A couple weeks ago I highlighted a solid paper produced by the New America Foundation regarding a new approach for securing rather than controlling the commons. I both praised and critiqued the paper, though the former certainly overshadowed the latter. Bryan McGrath, over at the excellent maritime strategy blog Information Dissemination, wrote a thoughtful criticism of his own, mostly of the paper, but also of my praise for it. McGrath’s response to both the paper and my posts was good, but in the process he slew some offshore balancing strawmen, and that didn’t sit right with me.

Rather than embark on a point-by-point rebuttal, I’m going to focus on his conclusion that offshore balancing is useless (neo)isolationism, which is representative of the most common arguments against offshore balancing. Like most who are opposed to offshore balancing, McGrath reduces a complex strategic concept to its most simplistic – and therefore absurdist – form without allowing for the inherently wide range of possible implementations.

McGrath’s overall argument is that Lalwani and Shifrinon’s paper is:

[j]ust another example of a neo-isolationist strand of offshore balancing which combines loathing of “free-riders” with conjured-up “insecurity” posed by our own powerful naval force presence-without seeing the obvious potential for real (rather than conjured) insecurity flowing from abandoned “free-riders” arming themselves with new vigor. They make nice noises about the maintenance of “sufficient” combat power to protect our interests, without any real proposal on how to maintain such a force against further budget axes—sure to fall when the American people and their representatives wake up to the expensive luxury that is ships operating off San Diego, Guam and Diego Garcia-not deterring anyone nor reassuring anyone.

McGrath mistakenly links offshore balancing to (neo)isolationism. That’s not entirely surprising; the very name implies it to a degree. Given the fact that Robert Pape is the head cheerleader, with some help from the Cato Institute, offshore balancing is always going to be linked with (neo)isolationist thinkers. Because of this association, offshore balancing is generally understood in a literal sense: rather than forward deploy troops in various regions around the world, the argument goes, we should just park the US Navy over the horizon so it can intervene when necessary.

But this is a distorted and overly simplified view of offshore balancing. Moreover, this view is only one possible operational component of the larger offshore balancing strategy.

Offshore balancing is actually part of a realist strategic worldview, not a (neo)isolationist one. The basic idea is that one country uses friends and allies to check the rise of (potentially) hostile powers (see John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics for the Full Monty). Rather than committing your own military resources to preventing another power from challenging you, you let friends and allies shoulder that burden. The end results is that a country such as China is too busy worrying about India, Japan, and other countries to challenge the U.S. directly.

This isn’t a novel idea: the U.S. has engaged in offshore balancing at numerous times in history. Support for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, and support for the mujahedeen in Afghanistan are just a few examples. Now, I understand that the response to this might be that in none of those instances did offshore balancing work: we ended up fighting World War II, Saddam Hussein became our enemy anyway, and, well, we all know how Afghanistan turned out. But I want to point out that if you assume that U.S. national debt is already a crushing problem and that entitlements are not going away, given the woeful state of the U.S. economy, the inevitable conclusion is that the U.S. Department of Defense cannot continue simultaneously acting as the Japanese, Saudi Arabian, and Western European Departments of Defense too. Offshore balancing must be part and parcel of any U.S. national security strategy going forward because we can’t afford to guarantee everybody’s security by ourselves. Somebody else has to step up to the plate.

The problem with offshore balancing is how to operationalize it. Lalwani and Shifrinson ran headfirst into this problem. They focused on the maritime commons and removed it from a strategic context which, as McGrath notes is problematic. I will be the first to admit that operationalizing it is tricky, and to be frank, I don’t exactly know how to do it. Luckily, that’s not my job… yet.

Regardless, removing the U.S. security blanket does not imply—as McGrath and other offshore balancing opponents would have us believe—that the U.S. would necessarily abandon our friends and allies, allowing those regions to descend into Hobbesian anarchy. The U.S. would obviously have to manage any transition from global primacy to security provider of last resort. We could still provide security for various countries while those countries reinforced their conventional military defenses, thus mitigating an arms purchase free for all. We would presumably do this regardless to make sure that the U.S. was the country providing those arms.

Most importantly, it is not necessary for various smaller powers to reach parity with stronger regional powers. For example, our East Asian allies do not need the ability to fight a major conventional war with China; they simply need the ability to prevent any possible Chinese military action from becoming a fait accompli by delaying the Chinese military long enough for the U.S. Navy to sail to the rescue (with Uncle Sam’s Misguided Children, of course). And of course, we should assume that the U.S. will continue to provide a nuclear umbrella for our friends and allies in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The point is that the redeployment of military forces from East Asia to Hawaii or Guam does not necessarily imply the total abandonment of that region. There is a middle ground between the extremes of acting as Japan’s Department of Defense, providing100% of their security, and abandoning them in totality.

Which leads me to my next point—the state of the debate.

By linking offshore balancing to (neo)isolationism, McGrath commits what Patrick Porter calls an isolationist heresy. Porter writes:

Isolationism has become an inflated concept wielded to close down debate. This is due to the narrowness of the strategic debate in Washington. A diarchy of liberal internationalists and muscular nationalist hawks places all other ideas under the shadow of a Wilsonian tradition, in which the U.S. has no choice to secure itself but to dominate and convert the world… Both major parties have marginalized contrary visions. Those who argue for a withdrawal from global primacy are only to be found on the political fringes of American conservatism and progressivism. In such a narrow political intellectual market, the richness of competing traditions of American statecraft is reduced to caricature… The word ‘isolationist’ has also been emptied of meaning and become a rhetorical device to stifle and delegitimize dissent.

McGrath’s argument inadvertently falls into this reductionist trap. By (mistakenly) reducing a complicated strategy like offshore balancing to simple (neo)isolationism, McGrath and others are able to paint their opponents as naïve, prop up the isolationist strawman, then knock it down. McGrath repeatedly puts quotations around “free rider” and “insecurity” as if to imply that these concepts only exist in the minds of those realists who dare propose a scaled back approach to America’s role in the world. In fact, free riding and insecurity are very real byproducts of a global primacy, power projection force posture. Full stop. That’s not up for debate. What is up for debate is whether we accept these byproducts as the cost of doing business. That’s a debate in which I’m willing to engage.

Perhaps it’s unsurprising that the toxic domestic political climate has skulked into the realm of foreign policy in the form of ideological simplicity. Tax. Spend. Cut. Three words dominate political discourse in a stark duality without a middle ground. Our foreign policy debates shouldn’t be similarly reduced to black or white affairs. We don’t have to choose between total isolationism and global primacy. There is a middle ground, and we desperately need to find it, sooner rather than later.

Update: Be sure to read Tom Wright’s insightful comments below. He makes some salient points that are a must read for this debate.

Posted in Strategery, War | 7 Comments

It’s What Columbus Would’ve Wanted

On Monday I went to AUSA 2011, the Association of the U.S. Army’s annual meeting and expo. For those who’ve never been, it’s three days and several city blocks’ worth of defense tradeshow, obviously geared towards ground war, with a fair bit of stuff-that-flies sprinkled in (think drones and helicopters). All the major contractors bring out their best toys in hopes of catching official eyes. I guess there are also some people talking about Army stuff, but uh, I have the listening skills of a two year old, so I skipped that in favor of wandering the halls ogling guns and trying to figure out what was making me so uneasy this year.

To back up a bit, I went to AUSA last year and had a great time. I was funemployed and still figuring out what the defense world was all about, so it was a good - if overwhelming - place to start. I flipped a simulated MRAP, outshot some dudes who really should’ve done better, instructed some ROTC guys in how to pop a magazine out of a pistol (I mean, really, what are they teaching kids these days?), and tested some energy-absorbing seat that simulates an IED exploding to, uh, demonstrate how it hurts less it otherwise could? I guess? I don’t really remember; I had to sign a waiver for that one, and I’m pretty sure I had a mild concussion afterwards. Lesson learned: never sign waivers at defense tradeshows.

MRAP, mid-flip. Derp.

But this year… I don’t know. There was this weird vibe all day, as though everybody’s playing musical chairs and really doesn’t want to be the kid left standing when the music stops and the budget cuts come in. The White-Haired Guys In Expensive Suits seemed on edge, particularly at the small arms booths, and they didn’t really have time to talk to peons; they were too busy scanning the room looking for the decision-makers, which I clearly was not. Given the chatter around the budget cut breakdowns, they’re probably right to be nervous, but still, it was frustrating, if only because I had actual questions this year.

FN Herstal, aka Browning. You can't tell, but it was all soft blue glowy light.

The thing about AUSA is that the exhibitions are so carefully engineered that it’s actually creepy. The lighting is high-contrast without glare. The surfaces are polished and shiny, unless they’re sandy (because war only happens in sandy places, of course). If there’s music, it’s dramatic and driving. The HESCO bar makes you forget that HESCOs are not usually bars. Hundreds of thousands of dollars are spent to make you feel relaxed, safe, powerful - and totally disconnected from war and death even as you browse the racks of rifles. Everything is calibrated to make you want to say Hooah! and forget that on the other end of that gun, somebody’s supposed to die. It’s a little… dehumanizing?

The HESCO Bar. Not shown: the young women serving beer.

And you also forget that these are just weapons systems, or communications equipment, or vehicles, or whatever. They can’t win wars if we don’t know what “winning” actually is, and since it’s not up to the military to define winning, we’re left standing around pretending this is the important part, that this is where our time and money should be spent, rather than on the nebulous political part of war. We discuss the merits of different product lines, because on the micro level it does matter what the individual soldier is carrying, but I can’t help but think that everything in that building can only prolong our wars - not end them.

But not gonna lie, laser marksmanship training systems are pretty badass. Hey L-3, can I have one?

I don’t mean this as an indictment of contractors, or of defense technology, or of procurement writ large. I’m just offering some broad impressions of this particular tradeshow, colored by being slightly under the weather and the company I was keeping (which, I love you all, but… we were not a chipper crowd, team).

So take it with some salt and go read my pals Spencer Ackerman and Paul Mcleary for actual reporting. Or read Carl Prine for the sarcasm I wanted to muster but couldn’t (yeah, I’m disappointed in me too).

At least the wardogs were cute?
Posted in Military, Slightly Larger Arms, War | Comments Off

A one-sentence review of Emily Miller’s WaTimes DC-gun-control story

Emily Miller’s “Emily Gets Her Gun” series won’t document the District’s obfuscatory and difficult bureaucracy impeding innocent citizens from getting the guns they have a right to own; instead, I imagine it’ll document heroic government workers stopping an unqualified person from getting a gun she probably doesn’t know how to load, much less use safely.

Bonus sentence: Going into the Gun Registry and saying “I’ve heard of a Glock [from] TV” is like going into the DMV and saying “I’ve heard of a Toyota”: neither entitles you to own the device in question, nor can you fault the DMV employees for being annoyed with your lack of research.

Bonus tweet:

Bonus link: The much, much, much better Washington Post article on the same subject.

Bonus throwing-her-a-bone: At least she’s got some trigger control in those photos…?

UPDATE: This post written in collaboration with The Drinksnob. He demanded credit, and also scotch.

Posted in GunsGunsGuns | 3 Comments